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CASES NOTED
tax has been paid and the instrument recorded.1 0 It would seem that the state
should be able to demand a quid pro quo in return for permitting a non-resident
mortgagee the protective remedy and advantages of enforcement.1 And if the
lender does not desire the security and privileges which the Florida courts may
bestow, he need not record and this tax will not be required.' 2
This change in construction was not entirely unexpected.' 8 It had been
recommended both as a means of increasing the revenue producing ability of
the intangibles tax 11 and as a more accurate connotation of the legislative de-
sign.15 It does seem, however, that this modification should have been per-
formed by the legislature and not by the court. While, in a strict sense, this can-
not be termed judicial legislation, the feasibility of two so varied interpretations
of the same statutes by the same court is wholly undesirable. Taxpayers are
entitled to a more secure knowledge of when they will be required to pay taxes
and how much they will be required to pay. It appears that much of the present
Florida tax legislation is inadequate and sorely in need of revision.' 6
TORTS-RES IPSA LOQUITUR-BACTERIA IN FOOD AS CAUSATION
Plaintiff relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, sought recovery under
a negligence statute 1 for death of her husband alleged to have been caused by
ptomaine poisoning as a result of eating in defendant's restaurant. Plaintiff es-
tablished through the undisputed testimony of two witnesses that two hours
after her husband ate he became violently ill, that he continued to suffer severe-
ly and that he was diagnosed two days later as having ptomaine poisoning. The
record is silent as to what the decedent had ingested, if anything, between the
time he ate and the time he was visited by the doctor, though it is clear that he
consumed nothing between the time he ate and the time he became ill. Six days
10. FLA. STAT. § 199.11(3) (Cum. Supp. 1947).
11. See note 6 supra.
12. The court, in the instant case, took judicial notice of the fact that the t lass C tax
is levied only when the mortgage is presented for recordation.
13. See Legis., Intangible Personal Property Tax; Limited Revenue Producing
Ability, 2 U. oi FLA. L. Rev. 262 (1949).
14. Id. at 272.
15. See (1948] ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERcAN LAW 239 n.57; note 9 s',P-,
16. See Bernstein, Property Exempt from Florida Taxation, I MI,.ri I. Q. 22, 35
(1947). "Each new Legislature adds to the tax machinery and in some instaie. 'he new
parts added do not fit well and hinder rather than assist the orderly functioning of the
machinery. Perhaps this situation could be remedied somewhat if the Legislat.re would
enact a law providing for the appointment of a Tax Commission, or a Tax Hnnrd, or a
Tax Council charged with the duty of making a study of the tax structure of 'e state,
and of all proposed tax legislation. This Commission should be composed] IJ ilt orneys
experienced in the tax field and could possibly work under the supcervi-i,, of the
Comptroller. The Commission could suggest the adoption of needed tax laws. A 11 .-roosed
legislative bills covering the field of taxation should be submitted to the c'ommission,
which could make recommendations and re-draft the bills so that they w~ll ' i'lto the
general tax scheme."
1. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1453 (1942).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
subsequent to the diagnosis the decedent died. On defendant's motion, the trial
court entered a judgment for defendants based upon a directed verdict. Held,
affirming the judgment on appeal, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does
not apply to germs or bacteria in food. Goodwin v. Misticos, 42 So,2d 397
(Miss. 1949).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a departure from the classical require-
ments of proof.2 It is a form of circumstantial evidence which enables a plain-
tiff who cannot allege and prove the specific nature of defendant's negligence
to bring his case before the jury.3 Generally, the conditions necessary for the
application of the doctrine are threefold : 4 (1) the accident must be of a kind
which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; (2) it must be
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant; and (3) there must not be contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff.
In reality, in determining negligence, all the law requires is reasonable
probabilities.5 Thus the well-established principle is that cases of this type
must stand or fall on their own particular facts. 6 The value of res ipsa loquitur
is in its flexibility. This has been manifested by many courts which allow the
use of the doctrine in cases,7 analogous to the instant one which involves bacteria
and food poisoning. But the doctrine has not been denied application solely on
the distinction that illness was caused by invisible bacteria rather than by visible
matter. On the contrary, res ipsa has been applied to cases where ptomaine
poisoning resulted from consumption of invisible bacteria in various foods. 8
The position taken by the court in the instant case adds confusion to the
status of res ipsa loquitur in Mississippi. A previous Mississippi case, 9 cited by
the principal case as controlling authority had merely held that on the facts the
doctrine did not apply. A vigorous and persuasive dissent argues that the case
relied on by the majority opinion is not authority for denying the application of
yes ipsa in bacteria cases.
It would appear that this decision represents a departure from the social
philosophy which the courts increasingly have manifested through their protec-
2. PuossER, Toars 291 (1941).
3. COMMENT, Application of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor to Food Cases. 3
MIAMI L.Q. 613 (1949).
4. See note 2 stpra, at 295.
5. SEAVY, Res lpsa Loquitrir: Tabria in Nanfragio, 63 HARvARD L. REV. 643 (1950).
6. Ogden v. Rosedale Inn, 189 So. 162 (La. App. 1939).
7. Mac Lehan v. Loft Candy Stores Inc., 172 So. 367 (La. App. 1937) ; Barringer
v. Ocern S.S. Co. of Savannah. 240, Mass. 405, 134 N.E. 265 (1922); Bergantino v.
General laking Co., 298 Mass. 106, 9 N.E.2d 521 (1937) ; Amabile v. Kramps, 121 N.J.L.
219, 2 A.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Leahy v. Essex Co., 164 App. Div. 903, 148 N.Y.S
1063 (3d I)ep't 1914).
8. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co, v. Waldrop, 237 Ala. 208, 186 So. 151 (1939) (mayo-
naise) : Criswell Baking Co. v. Milligan, 50 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. 1948) (pie); McPherson
v. Capuano & Co., 31 Ga. App. 82 (3), 121 S.E. 580 (2d Div. 1924) (sandwich); Camp-
bell v. G. C. Murphy Co., 122 Pa. Super. 342, 186 Ati. 269 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (chicken salad).
9. Johnston v. Swift & Co., 186 Miss. 803, 191 So. 423 (1939).
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tion of the food consumer.10 A possible explanation for the strict rule laid down
here is that it checks a trend toward absolute liability so often imposed on a
negligent vendor of food." In contrast, the majority of courts treat the con-
sumer as having the greater interest.
12
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-OFFICER OF CORPORATION
CONSIDERED EMPLOYEE TO EXTEND COVERAGE OF ACT
Plaintiff filed a claim for workmen's compensation for injuries sustained
while an employee in the service of the defendant corporation. In order to
bring this corporation within the jurisdiction of the compensation commission
five employees were required.' The commission found the president of the
defendant corporation in fact served in a dual capacity as executive and em-
ployee, thereby fulfilling the statutory requirement and awarded compensa-
tion. The circuit court affirmed the award. On appeal, held, that a president
of a corporation whose duties are dual in nature may be counted as an
employee for the purpose of bringing the corporation within the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act.2 Brook's, Inc. v. Cla yuell, 224 S.W.2d
37 (Ark. 1949).
The factors that govern whether an officer will be termed an employee
in order to bring the corporation within the provisions of a compensation
act are much the same as will entitle him to payments when he is injured.8
Generally, one will not be precluded from compensation for injuries sustained
in the scope of employment merely because of his position as a corporate
officer. 4 An award or denial will be determined by the circumstances of his
employment and his status in the corporate structure.5 When the officer per-
forms only the ceremonial tasks required for corporate organization he is
not classified as an employee.' If his acts are of a manual or mechanical char-
acter, the officer might meet the definition of an employee.7 However, when
the corporation is large and the salary paid to the president is in consideration
for the discharge of his duties as an officer this will ordinarily lead to the
10. See note 3 supro.
11. Id. at 621.
12. See note 8 supra.
1. 81 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1302 (c) (1939).
2. 81 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301-1349 (1939).
3. Workmen's Compensation Bureau v. People's Opinion Printing Co., 70 N.D.
442. 295 N.W. 656 (1941); State ex reL Murphy v. Welch & Brown, 187 Okla. 470, 103
P.7d 533 (1940).
4. Dewey v. Dewey Fuel Co., 210 Mich. 370, 178 N.W. 36 (1920); Skouitchi v.
Chic Cloak & Suit Co., 230 N.Y. 296, 130 N.E. 299 (1921). But cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Beasley, 140 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. 1940).
5. Grossman v. Industrial Comm'n, 376 IIl. 198, 33 N.E.2d 444 (1941); Delaney
v. Dan Delaney, Inc., 36 N.W.2d 12 (Minn. 1949).
6. See note 3 supra.
7. Southern Surety Co. v. Childers, 87 Okla. 182. 209 Pac. 927 (1922).
